ABSTRACT Widespread deployment of large-scale photovoltaics (PVs) and energy storage systems (ESSs) in distribution networks necessitates the development of methods to assess their possible system impacts. One of the primary concerns related to the integration of these systems is short-circuit overcurrent protection problems. Present techniques use simulations of full and detailed distribution circuit models with a large number of scenarios to estimate the PV and ESS sizes a distribution feeder can accommodate without causing adverse impacts. As this process requires considerable time and effort, this paper develops a practical and simplified analytical approach to conservatively estimate a utility distribution feeder's accommodation limits without causing protection problems. Sympathetic tripping and relay insensitivity problems are considered in this paper under both symmetrical and unsymmetrical fault conditions. Using the analysis presented, the factors influencing these protection problems are determined to provide insights into relay settings. The feeder accommodation limits obtained using the proposed analytical approach are compared with those obtained using simulations of an actual detailed distribution circuit model. The findings show that the proposed approach is accurate in estimating the feeder's accommodation limits for integrating large-scale PV and ESS.
I. INTRODUCTION
The installed capacity of photovoltaic (PV) systems has grown rapidly in the past decade in the U.S. This growth can be attributed primarily to the decline in the PV prices and the incentives from the government [1] . Being highly scalable, the PV installations can be found in various sizes ranging from few kilowatts to several hundreds of megawatts. The PV systems of smaller ratings such as those found on residential and commercial rooftops can be considered as small-scale PV systems. According to Energy Information Administration (EIA), the PV systems of ratings above 1 MW can be considered as utility-scale or large-scale PV systems [2] . Besides the small-scale residential PV systems, large-scale PV installations are also in commercial operation now in the distribution feeders [3] . Integration of distributed generation (DG) such as PV, in general, brings numerous technical benefits such as reduced line losses, improved voltage profiles, and enhanced system reliability [4] . However, it also poses challenges to existing system protection schemes and utility voltage regulation practices [5] .
Before integrating DG, system studies need to be performed to assess associated impacts on the existing overcurrent protection schemes [6] . The impact is highly dependent on the type of DG being integrated. Influence of rotating machine-based DG (RBDG) such as synchronous machinebased DG and induction machine-based DG on feeder overcurrent protection schemes is reported in [7] and [8] . As opposed to the RBDG, inverter-interfaced distributed generation (IIDG) such as PV systems do not make much fault current contribution. While the fault current contribution of PV systems can vary from 1.1 to 2.5 times the inverter rated current depending on the type of inverter, the rule of thumb in the industry for system studies is two times the inverter rated current [9] , [10] . Such low PV fault currents may not interfere with the overcurrent protection schemes in case of small-scale PV systems with low penetration level. However, large-scale PV installations can inject high fault currents into the system and can lead to protection problems [11] , [12] . Some of the operational issues associated with PV can be mitigated by installing and operating Energy Storage System (ESS) along with PV [13] .
ESS have many applications in both transmission and distribution systems. In a distribution system, the benefits of ESS include peak shaving, load leveling, time-shifting of renewable energy, and voltage stabilization [14] . Although the ESS have various benefits, their wide-spread deployment is being limited by few barriers. The key barrier among them as on date is the cost. Nevertheless, there are numerous large-scale ESS projects in commercial operation now world-wide [15] . Further, the deployment of ESS is expected to grow dramatically in near future [16] . Similar to PV systems, the fault current contributions from ESS can also have adverse impacts on the distribution feeder overcurrent protection schemes [17] . Considering the widespread existence and expected growth of large-scale ESS, there is a need to study the influence of ESS on feeder overcurrent protection schemes.
The amount of PV a distribution feeder can accommodate without violating the nominal system operating conditions is the feeder's PV hosting capacity or feeder's PV accommodation limit [18] . In case of ESS, it can be referred to as ESS accommodation limit of the circuit. Approaches for determination of a feeder's accommodation limits with relay insensitivity and sympathetic tripping as impact criteria using circuit simulations are reported in [19] and [20] . Keeping in view of the new grid regulations and worst case system conditions, these studies are performed considering 'low voltage ride through' (LVRT) requirement of the PV systems. With the growing concerns to integrate higher amounts of PV into distribution systems along with possible adverse impact mitigating measures such as installing ESS, suitable methods are required for estimating the sizes of large-scale PV and ESS a feeder can accommodate without creating protection problems. In this work, an analytical approach is presented to determine a distribution feeder's accommodation limits of integrating large-scale PV and ESS based on relay insensitivity and sympathetic tripping as impact criteria considering LVRT. The analysis presented in this work is validated against simulation studies on a distribution circuit model in OpenDSS developed using actual circuit data from a utility. The results match within 7% of theoretical predictions, thus validate the analysis. This paper is organized into six sections. The problem statement and the motivation of this work are detailed in Section II. An overview of distribution feeder overcurrent protection is provided in Section III. The relay insensitivity and sympathetic tripping problems are also described in this section. In Section IV, the analysis of relay insensitivity and sympathetic tripping protection problems in the presence of large-scale PV and ESS is presented and key parameters influencing these problems are discussed. Section V presents the simulation results using a detailed distribution circuit model that validate the analysis. The conclusions and discussion are provided in Section VI.
II. PROBLEM STATMENT AND MOTIVATION
Protection studies, similar to other impact studies, for deployment of PV systems require development of detailed distribution system models using distribution system simulation tools [21] . Then the developed model is validated using suitable methods such as comparing power flow results with actual field measurements. Once the validated model is available, simulation studies are performed to assess the impact of PV integration on protection schemes with large number of scenarios. However, this process requires considerable time and effort [22] . Furthermore, in this particular case of determining feeder accommodation limits of integrating PV using circuit simulations, the approach presented in [19] is useful to study only small test systems with few nodes. Such a simulation based approach when applied to actual distribution feeders having thousands of buses poses several complications of scalability. Some of the reported scalability challenges are power flow solution convergence problems, complexity of analysis and visualization of results considering large number of fuses, and huge time requirement to study all possible combinations of PV sizes and fault locations [20] . These complexities can be handled to some extent by using network reduction technique [23] and some reasonable approximations such as modeling only few main protection devices such as reclosers, simulating only few representative scenarios of selected PV locations [20] . However, the accommodation limits obtained as outcome pertains only to that particular circuit and is valid only for a particular set of protection device settings. As such, the conclusions may not necessarily be applicable to other circuits or even to the same circuit with different protection device settings as the results are highly dependent on the circuit characteristics.
In the absence of insights into the relationship among various system parameters, the utility planners are usually forced to apply conservative rules of thumb penetration levels to accept PV interconnection requests. For PV integration, the penetration level is limited to 15% of the maximum feeder load on a line section to avoid any adverse impacts [19] . Alternatively, system studies need to be performed with all possible combinations of fault types, fault locations, PV sizes, and PV locations which is time consuming posing scalability challenges and resulting in circuit specific outcomes. In this context, the main contribution of this work is development of a scalable analysis-based method to conservatively estimate large-scale PV and ESS accommodation limits of a distribution feeder without causing relay insensitivity and sympathetic tripping problems. The objective is to simplify the estimation process with reasonable approximations under conservative settings. The other contribution is providing insights into overcurrent relay settings when large-scale PV and ESS are present. The analysis for assessing the impact of ESS installed either individually or in conjunction with PV on the protection relay response and its application to assess accommodation limits of a utility distribution feeder is not reported in literature.
In recent years, there are several changes to the regulations for grid interconnection of DG. While previous regulations mandated disconnection of DG during abnormal system conditions, many new regulations require the DG to remain connected during the faults, referred to as 'low voltage ride through' (LVRT) or 'fault ride through' (FRT). Similar to DG, as part of grid support functions, the ESS also offers LVRT functionality [24] . Since protection studies are performed considering the worst case situation, it is reasonable to consider that the large-scale PV and ESS remain connected in the system during the fault conditions and assess the impact of their steady state current injection into the distribution network [20] . Thus, in this work, analysis is provided considering LVRT requirements of PV and ESS.
III. OVERVIEW OF DISTRIBUTION FEEDER OVERCURRENT PROTECTION AND IMPACTS OF PV AND ESS
Majority of the conventional distribution systems are radial in nature as the radial systems are less expensive, simpler in planning, design and operation compared to other alternatives [25] . In radial systems, the primary substation is the only source feeding the distribution loads and there exists only a single path between each customer and the substation. Typically, overcurrent protection is the main feeder protection in radial systems. Overcurrent relays, circuit breakers, reclosers, sectionalizers and fuses are the main protection devices in overcurrent protection schemes. The role of these protection devices and the overcurrent protection coordination are briefly explained in this section. Then relay insensitivity and sympathetic tripping problems that may arise due to the presence of large-scale PV and ESS are described.
A. OVERCURRENT PROTECTION DEVICES 1) CIRCUIT BREAKERS
Circuit breakers are used to protect the distribution networks by interrupting the fault currents during faulty circuit conditions. Overcurrent relays control the circuit breaker operations. While isolating the faulted line section, due to the interruption of inductive current, electric arc forms between the circuit breaker contacts. To quench the electric arc, circuit breakers use different types of arc-extinguishing media such as air, oil, vacuum or SF 6 gas.
2) OVERCURRENT RELAYS
Overcurrent relays are the fault sensing devices that detect faults in the distribution system and open the circuit breaker. They can function as phase overcurrent or ground overcurrent relays depending on the current being monitored. Phase overcurrent relays detect the fault currents flowing in the lines. When the line currents are above the phase overcurrent relay pickup setting, the relay trips the circuit breaker. The trip time depends upon the time-dial setting of the relay. For detecting the ground faults, ground overcurrent relays are used. These relays provide more sensitive protection for phase to ground faults. The ground overcurrent relays respond to the residual current which is the sum of the currents in all the three phases in a three-phase distribution system. When the residual current seen by the ground overcurrent relay exceeds the relay pickup setting, it opens the circuit breaker.
3) RECLOSERS
A recloser trips the circuit whenever a fault is detected and automatically recloses after a predetermined time in the anticipation of the fault getting cleared. This reclosing action is performed a preset number of times after which the recloser will stay open and isolates the fault if the fault still persists in the circuit. As majority of the faults in the overhead distribution systems are temporary in nature and last for only a few cycles, the reclosers avoid unnecessary service outage for temporary faults. Reclosers can detect both phase and ground overcurrent conditions and therefore have the ability to protect the distribution network in case of both balanced and unbalanced permanent faults.
4) SECTIONALIZERS
Sectionalizers are used to isolate the faulted sections of a distribution circuit after an upstream protection device has interrupted the fault current. Since sectionalizers do not have fault current interrupting capability, they must be used in conjunction with backup protection devices such as circuit breaker or recloser and are installed downstream from the backup protection device. Under fault conditions, the sectionalizer counts the number of upstream recloser operations. In case of temporary faults, the fault gets cleared before the recloser finishes the preset number of reclose operations. Then the circuit recloses successfully and the sectionalizer counter resets to its normal position. Thus, the service to the customers is continued with few momentary interruptions during recloser operations. In case of permanent faults, the recloser remains open after the preset number of recloser operations, isolating the faulty section of line.
5) FUSES
Fuses consist of a fusible metallic conductor link that passes current under normal circuit conditions. During faults, the fuse link melts due to overheat produced by the fault current and opens the fuse contacts, thus interrupts the fault current. The time of operation of a fuse depends upon the fault current and the time current characteristic (TCC) of the fuse. The TCC has two curves: (i) the minimum melt curve and (ii) the total clearing curve as shown in Fig. 1 . The minimum melting curve is a plot of the minimum time required to melt the fuse link against the fault current. The total clearing curve is a plot of the longest melting time versus the current required to melt the fuse link. When a fuse melts, the fault current and its associated time would lie between the two curves. 
B. OVERCURRENT PROTECTION COORDINATION
The process of selecting the appropriate settings for the overcurrent relays such that whenever there is a fault, the overcurrent relay operations ensure that the fault is isolated as fast as possible while causing minimum service outage to the customers is known as protection coordination. The coordination arrangement is done such that whenever there is a fault, all the protective devices sense the fault but the device that is closest to the fault (main protective device) operates first. If the main protective device fails to operate, the next protective device upstream (backup protective device) would operate after some time delay to isolate the fault. Thus, upstream protective devices provide backup protection for the downstream protective devices.
Following distribution system data is required for choosing proper overcurrent relay settings [26] : i) One-line diagram of the distribution system with locations of protective devices and their time current characteristics ii) Maximum expected load current through the protective devices iii) Maximum and minimum fault currents or short-circuit levels at each protective device
The details of expected load currents and fault currents through the protective devices are obtained from load flow study and fault studies respectively. All the protective devices need to be well coordinated with each other. In what follows, the typical protective device coordinations that need to be taken care of are briefed.
1) FUSE-FUSE COORDINATION
The coordination among the fuses connected in series can be achieved by appropriate selection of TCC curves of the fuses. When fuses are in series, the fuse that is nearest to the fault can be referred to as main fuse or protecting fuse. The next fuse upstream towards the source of supply is backup fuse or protected fuse. For proper coordination, the total clearing time of the main fuse should not exceed 75% of the minimum melting time of the backup fuse for a given current level [26] . This ensures that the main fuse melts and isolates faulty line section before the backup fuse is damaged. The 25% margin accounts for the variables such as load current, ambient temperature and partial melting of the fuse due to fault currents of short duration.
2) RECLOSER-FUSE COORDINATION
The coordination between recloser and fuse depends upon their relative locations and which device is intended to act as the backup device to the other. When the fuse is at the source side and upstream from the recloser, the fuse is the backup device to the recloser. Then to prevent melting of the fuse, all the recloser operations should be faster than the fuse. To account for cumulative heating effect on the fuse due to multiple recloser operations, the recloser slow curve is multiplied by a factor to make it slower as shown in Fig. 2 (a). Still, this slower curve also should lie below the minimum melting curve of the fuse making the recloser operations faster before the fuse gets affected. When the fuse is at the load side and downstream from the recloser, the fuse acts as the main protective device. In this case, both the minimum melting and total clearing curves of the fuse FIGURE 2. Fuse-recloser coordination (a) when fuse is at the source side (b) when fuse is at the load side. VOLUME 4, 2016 should lie in between the recloser fast and slow curves as shown in Fig. 2 
(b).

3) RECLOSER-RECLOSER COORDINATION
When there are more than one recloser present in a distribution system, coordination is required among them. In such situations, utilities prefer to accomplish the recloser-recloser coordination by selecting different types of reclosers. If same type of reclosers are chosen, the coordination can be done by selection of different current ratings or different operating sequences of the reclosers. Fig. 3 shows the typical arrangement of circuit breakers, reclosers, and sectionalizers in a typical distribution system. The feeder breakers are usually equipped with overcurrent protection relays. The operations of the relays controlling the circuit breaker need to be time delayed to allow the fault clearance by the downstream reclosers. In case of permanent faults downstream of the recloser, the sectionalizers isolate the faulted section at a current zero after preset number of recloser operations. This operation of the sectionalizer allows the service to resume to healthy feeder section after the recloser closes the circuit. 
4) RELAY COORDINATION WITH RECLOSERS AND SECTIONALIZERS
C. IMPACTS OF PV AND ESS ON DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM PROTECTION
Distribution system overcurrent protection schemes assume single source of supply in the system and unidirectional current flow from the source to the customer loads. The presence of PV systems, ESS and their corresponding current injections effectively creates multiple sources and bi-directional current flows in the system. This interferes with the protection relaying and causes protection issues [6] . Following impacts of PV and ESS on the distribution system overcurrent protection are reported in literature:
1) REDUCTION OF REACH
In distribution systems, overcurrent relays control the utility breaker and reclosers. The overcurrent relays are set to detect faults within a certain distance along the feeder, referred to as 'reach' of the relay. Reach of an overcurrent relay is determined by its pickup current setting. Usually, the pickup current setting is chosen above the maximum load current and below the minimum fault current in the feeder so that the relay does not respond to the load currents and be able to detect and respond to the fault currents [27] . The fault current contributions from DG reduce the fault current seen by the upstream protection devices. As a result, reach of the upstream protection devices is reduced. For a sufficiently high level of fault current injections by DG, as happens in the case of large-scale PV, upstream protection devices may fail to detect the fault. This phenomenon is called relay insensitivity. Reduction of relay reach is illustrated in Fig. 4 where a large-scale PV system is planned to be connected to a bus in the middle of the feeder. The fault current contribution by the PV for a fault downstream of the PV reduces the reach of the relay upstream. Fault analysis to calculate reduction of relay reach considering RBDG is presented in [19] and [28] . Unlike the RBDG, which acts as a voltage behind a reactance during the faults, IIDG acts as a current source due to the current controllers present in the IIDG controlling their power output [12] . Therefore, the fault analysis of RBDG is not applicable to IIDG. Considering this fact, analysis for the impact of IIDG on relay reach with IIDG acting as a current source is reported in [29] - [31] . A real-world example of a potential relay insensitivity problem in a distribution feeder due to the integration of a large-scale PV system is reported in [3] , indicating the necessity of studying relay insensitivity problem.
2) SYMPATHETIC TRIPPING
Sympathetic tripping occurs when the fault current from the PV causes relays on the healthy feeder to pick up for faults on the adjacent feeders and results in unnecessary outage of the healthy feeder [5] , [6] . This is illustrated in Fig. 5 where a large-scale PV system is connected in Feeder 1 and a fault occurs on adjacent Feeder 2. During the fault, if the PV system remains in the circuit as per LVRT requirements, it feeds the fault back through the relay 'R' at the substation. When the large-scale PV is of considerable size, the fault current from the PV can go above the pickup setting of the overcurrent relay at the substation causing unwanted tripping of the Feeder 1 [32] - [34] .
While sympathetic tripping may not be likely a problem in case of small-scale PV with low penetration levels, it is a potential problem with high penetration of PV or large- scale PV [35] , [36] . The IIDG impact study results using an actual utility distribution circuit model and protection device settings reported in [20] indicates that sympathetic tripping is one of the major issues utility planners face due to the integration of IIDG. Solutions for preventing the protection problems under study are reported in [37] - [39] . However, implementing these over many distribution networks can be a costly decision [20] . Therefore, there is a strong motivation to perform comprehensive analysis into relay insensitivity and sympathetic tripping problems.
3) PROTECTION COORDINATION ISSUES
The bi-directional current flows due to fault current injections from PV and ESS interfere with the coordination of overcurrent protective devices and could lead to misoperations. The exact impact typically depends upon the size of the PV, relative locations of PV, ESS and protective devices, protection settings and the distribution system feeder impedance.
4) REVERSE POWER FLOW
At higher PV penetration levels and minimum loading condition in the feeder, the power flow direction reverses at the substation when the PV generation is more than the power consumption in the feeder. The reverse power flow could possibly operate the reverse power relays installed at the head of the feeder causing outage of the feeder significantly affecting the system reliability [40] . The power reversal could also cause incorrect operation of voltage regulators and capacitor controls as these controls are not designed for reverse power flow. This increases the number of operations and related equipment wear in addition to power quality problems to the customers. The operational problems due to reverse power flow include over voltages on the distribution feeder and increased short-circuit levels.
5) FUSE SAVING AND FUSE TRIPPING
Majority of the faults in the distribution systems are temporary in nature. They occur momentarily for various reasons and are cleared by themselves. Isolation of such faults by blowing the fuses creates unnecessary long duration service outages. To minimize the service outages for temporary faults, utilities use 'fuse saving' practice for coordination of breaker or recloser with the downstream fuses. In this practice, the breaker or recloser operates on fast curve before the fuse gets affected as was shown in Fig. 2(b) . This saves the fuse in case of temporary faults. For permanent faults, the fuse blows when the breaker or recloser operates on slow curve after preset number of fast operations. The faster curve of breaker or recloser can also be replaced with instantaneous overcurrent elements. In that case, the instantaneous overcurrent element trips the breaker or recloser before the fuse melts and is blocked temporarily. If the fault is permanent, the fuse blows as the breaker or recloser operation is delayed based on their slow curve. The fuse saving practice leads to increased number of momentary service interruptions as the breaker or recloser trips the entire line downstream for all faults. As such, the utilities follow fuse tripping practice wherein the fuse is allowed to blow for all faults. The fuse blowing practice produces fewer momentary interruptions but more sustained interruptions.
The DG installations could affect the timing coordination between breaker/recloser and the fuse due to the additional fault current contribution from the DG. As a result, the fuse could blow first or both the fuse and breaker/recloser could operate at the same time [41] .
IV. ANALYSIS OF RELAY REACH AND SYMPATHETIC TRIPPING WITH PV AND ESS
In this section, the impact of large-scale PV and ESS on the overcurrent relay reach and sympathetic tripping is analyzed. Battery energy storage system is assumed for ESS.
A. REDUCTION OF RELAY REACH
Consider the distribution circuit shown in Fig. 6 where a large-scale PV system is planned to be connected to a bus in the middle of the feeder. The upstream transmission system of the substation including the substation transformer is represented by a Thevenin equivalent circuit with impedance Z eq . Phase overcurrent relay 'R' is installed at the substation. Since the faults farther from the substation cause minimum fault currents which are more challenging to detect, a remote end fault with resistance R f is assumed for conservative study. The impedances of the feeder sections upstream and downstream of the PV location are represented by Z Line1 and Z Line2 , respectively. 
1) ANALYSIS FOR SYMMETRICAL FAULTS
Consider the fault in Fig. 6 is a three-phase fault. Fig. 7(a) shows the equivalent circuit of the system when the PV is not connected. Using Kirchoff's voltage law (KVL), the fault VOLUME 4, 2016 current seen by the relay is given by:
where V sg and I R,noPV are the line-to-ground pre-fault voltage at the substation bus and fault current through the relay without PV, repectively.
When the large-scale PV system is connected injecting a fault current I f PV during the three-phase fault, the equivalent circuit of the distribution system is shown in Fig. 7(b) . Then the fault current through the relay with the large-scale PV connected can be obtained by applying superposition in Fig. 7(b) as
Equation (2) shows that the fault current through the relay is reduced due to the fault current contribution from the PV during a three-phase fault. This current seen by the relay is also influenced by the available short-circuit capacity at the substation. The location of PV alters the fault current distribution. During faults, the PV systems behave like constant power sources and the PV inverters try to push the same power even at the low terminal voltages by injecting higher currents [31] . As such, a PV system located close to the fault can inject a higher current due to its lower terminal voltage compared to the PV system located far away from the fault which has higher terminal voltage during the same fault for a given PV power output. Conservatively, this current can be considered as two times the inverter rated current [31] . When the PV fault current contribution is fixed at this value, the PV can be placed close to the substation with the fault at the end of the feeder as per (2) so that Z Line2 is maximum causing more reduction in the fault current seen by the relay at the substation. In such a scenario, when the three-phase fault resistance is sufficiently high, the fault current seen by the relay goes below its phase overcurrent pickup value, making the relay insensitive to the fault. Under this situation, any additional fault current contribution from the PV would further reduce the fault current seen by the relay and make it insensitive to the faults with lesser fault resistance. In other words, the large-scale PV reduces the reach of the overcurrent relay.
Considering the bus voltage phasor where the large-scale PV/ESS is connected as reference and the steady-state fault current contribution from the large-scale PV is twice the PV rated current in phase with the bus voltage [9] , [10] , [20] , the fault current through the phase overcurrent relay from (2) can be expressed in terms of the PV size as (3). Taking the PV/ESS bus voltage as reference significantly reduces the complexity of analysis without introducing much error in the estimate. Although the analysis is done in this paper by assuming PV fault current contribution is two times its rated current (rule of thumb for system studies), the analysis can be extended along the same lines for other levels of PV fault current contributions depending upon PV inverter technology.
where
When the ESS is also present in the system, we need to consider its fault current contribution also [42] for assessing the reduction in the upstream relay current. Since the ESS also uses power electronic interface similar to PV, its fault current contribution may also be approximated as two times its rated current for conservative analysis. Furthermore, the ESS acts as an active load when it is in charging mode and as a generator when it is in discharging mode. For conservative protection studies, the ESS need to be acting as a generator to contribute fault current. Therefore, it is considered as operating in discharge mode with 100% discharge rate to ensure maximum fault current contribution. This additional fault current contribution from ESS results in further reduction in the relay reach. Then (2) can be modified as:
where I f ESS is the fault current contribution from the ESS. It is observed from Z that the maximum reach reduction occurs when Z Line2 is maximum i.e., when the PV or ESS is installed close to the substation and the fault is located at the remote end. Under this condition, if the grid impedance Z eq is neglected as it is typically much smaller than the feeder impedance, then Z = 1. This implies that the reduction in phase overcurrent relay current is exactly equal to the fault current injection from the PV or ESS.
2) ANALYSIS FOR UNSYMMETRICAL FAULTS
When the fault at the remote end of the feeder is single-line to ground (SLG), the analysis can be done using sequence networks. The sequence network diagrams of the distribution system without PV and with PV during the fault are shown in Fig. 8(a) and Fig. 8(b) , respectively. The relay 'R' at the substation is considered as ground overcurrent relay for unsymmetrical fault analysis. Noting that the positive and negative sequence impedances of distribution lines are equal, corresponding impedances of feeder sections upstream and downstream of the PV location are denoted as Z Line1 and Z Line2 respectively in the figure. Zero sequence impedances of the feeder sections are denoted by Z 0 Line1 and Z 0 Line2 . When the large-scale PV is not connected, from Fig. 8(a) , the positive, negative and zero sequence currents through the relay are all equal and are given by:
The fault current through the relay at the substation is three times the zero sequence current
where 'N ' denotes the neutral. When the PV is connected, the sequence components of the PV current injections during the SLG fault condition can be computed as:
For SLG faults, it is expected that the ground overcurrent relay senses the ground fault current which is three times the zero sequence current and trips. The zero sequence current through the relay can be computed by applying superposition in Fig. 8 
For the worst case scenario, the maximum unbalance is considered in the large-scale PV fault current injections i.e., it is assumed that the PV is injecting two times the rated current (I PV ) in the faulted phase and rated currents in the healthy phases as shown in Fig. 9 .
The sequence components of fault currents injected by the PV for maximum unbalance is given by:
VOLUME 4, 2016 FIGURE 9. Fault current injections by PV systems for maximum unbalance during the SLG fault.
From (5) and (6), the zero sequence current through the relay for maximum unbalance is given by:
The ground fault current seen by the relay is three times the zero sequence current:
. In terms of PV rating, (8) may be expressed as
Considering maximum PV unbalance, the maximum reduction in ground fault current seen by the relay due to the presence of PV is given by (8) . It indicates that the ground fault current reduction depends on PV rated current (PV size), fault resistance, PV location and available shortcircuit capacity at the substation. For the worst case scenario, PV is installed close to the substation and SLG fault occurs at feeder's remote end resulting in maximum ground fault current reduction.
From the parameters of Z , it is observed that the maximum reach reduction occurs when Z Line2 is maximum i.e., when the PV is installed close to the substation and the fault is at remote end. Under this condition, if Z eq is neglected, then Z = 1. This implies that the reduction in ground overcurrent relay current is exactly equal to the rated PV current which is less than PV fault current contribution. As such, the reduction in ground fault current seen by feeder head-end relay is less than the phase overcurrent relay current reduction in case of three-phase faults.
When the ESS is also present, analysis can be done along the same lines and the ground fault current seen by the upstream relay can be obtained from (8) as
For conservative estimation, (10) considers that both ESS and PV fault currents are in phase with each other. Then, the PV rating in (9) includes both PV and ESS ratings.
Sometimes the phase overcurrent relays alone are used for protection against all types of faults [43] . As such, we are also interested in determining the reduction of fault current seen by the phase overcurrent relay installed at the substation due to the ground fault current injections by the PV and ESS during remote end SLG fault. The fault current seen by phase overcurrent relay in the presence of large-scale PV can be computed by applying superposition in Fig. 8 
When the maximum unbalance is considered from (6) and (11), we can determine the maximum reduction in this fault current as: (12) where
The above equation indicates that the ground fault current contribution of the large-scale PV during the SLG fault downstream causes reduction in the fault current seen by the upstream phase overcurrent relay also. The above analysis can be extended to include the impact of ESS also as
In (13), fault current injection of ESS is considered as in phase with the PV fault current injection for maximum reduction. In terms of the PV and ESS ratings, (13) 
B. SYMPATHETIC TRIPPING
To analyze the sympathetic tripping, consider the system shown in Fig. 10(a) where a large-scale PV system is installed in Feeder 1 and a three-phase fault is assumed on adjacent Feeder 2. Its equivalent circuit is shown in Fig. 10(b) . During the fault, the PV system feeds the fault back through the relay 'R' at the substation.
1) ANALYSIS FOR SYMMETRICAL FAULTS
From Fig. 10(b) , the fault current through the relay in Feeder 1 is
It indicates that the current through the relay solely depends on the fault current from the large-scale PV system and flows in the reverse direction. Therefore, as the PV size increases, its fault current contribution also increases and eventually trips the relay when the fault current contribution from the PV goes above the phase overcurrent relay pickup current setting.
Considering that I f PV is twice the I PV for the conservative study, the magnitude of fault current flowing through the relay can be expressed in terms of the PV rating as:
If the ESS is also present in the system, we need to consider its fault current contribution also for the sympathetic tripping study. Considering the PV and ESS fault current contributions are in phase for conservative estimation, the fault current seen by the relay becomes |I R | = |I f PV + I f ESS | and the PV rating in (15) includes ESS rating also.
2) ANALYSIS FOR UNSYMMETRICAL FAULTS
In case of SLG faults, the ground overcurrent relay of the feeder shall detect the ground fault current and trip. The ground fault current or residual current through the relay is the sum of the fault currents being injected by the PV system in all the three phases and can be expressed as:
From (6) and (16), the current seen by the ground overcurrent relay under maximum unbalance condition is I RN ,PV = |I PV |. In terms of PV rating, this can be expressed as
When the ESS is also present, the total ground fault current through the relay would be vectorial sum of both the ground fault currents from the PV and the ESS which is given by
where I f PV 0 and I f ESS0 are the zero sequence current injections from PV and ESS respectively.
For conservative estimation, the ESS fault current injection would be in phase with PV fault current. Then the PV rating in (17) gives combined PV and ESS rating.
V. VALIDATION OF RELAY REACH AND SYMPATHETIC TRIPPING ANALYSIS USING SIMULATIONS ON UTILITY DISTRIBUTION FEEDER MODEL
The analysis presented in the previous section is validated through the simulation studies on a utility distribution feeder model in OpenDSS. The generator and storage objects available in the OpenDSS model library are used for simulating PV and ESS respectively. A common approach to model inverters for a fault study is to assume inverters behave like synchronous generators during faults. The transient reactance X d then can be adjusted to obtain desired fault current output like a PV inverter [44] . The generator model (model 7) available in OpenDSS is useful for this purpose to approximate the nominal behavior of the inverter based DG systems [45] . For simulating PV fault current behavior two times its rated current, the 'xdp' parameter of the generator model (model 7) is adjusted to 0.5.
A. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
For simulation studies, a detailed distribution circuit model has been developed in OpenDSS using the data obtained from a utility. The data comprises of transformer, line data, load profiles, capacitors, regulator data etc. The system has VOLUME 4, 2016 a 24 MVA transformer at the substation. The three-phase and single-phase short-circuit MVA of transmission system upstream of the substation transformer are 562 MVA and 93 MVA respectively. A 1.6 mi long 12.47 kV level primary distribution feeder is supplied by this transformer. Maximum loading in the feeder is 15.77 MW and the corresponding load current is 730 A. Minimum loading is 6 MW. This detailed distribution circuit model is used for simulations. Fig. 11 shows the single-line diagram of the distribution system used for theoretical calculations. The sequence impedances of the system are obtained from the short-circuit study which are given in the Table 1 . Following are the circuit conditions considered for this study:
a) The breaker installed at the feeder head is controlled by both phase and ground overcurrent relays. The pickup current setting for the phase overcurrent relay should be above the maximum cold load pickup current in the feeder and below the minimum fault current. Typically, a pickup value of 1.5 to 3 times the maximum steady-state load current is used [46] . In this study, a pickup current of 1500 A is used for the phase overcurrent relay which is 2.05 p.u. of the maximum steady-state load current in the circuit (730 A). For ground overcurrent relays, the pickup current need to be above the maximum expected unbalance current in the circuit. For most feeders, the ground relays are set with a pickup range from 25% to 50% of the phase relay pickup [46] . In this study, 750 A is chosen as a pickup current setting for the ground overcurrent relay which is 0.5 p.u. of the phase relay pickup setting.
b) The PV and ESS are connected to a bus approximately 0.83 mi away from the substation (Bus 2) and the fault is simulated at the remote bus (Bus 3) as shown in Fig. 11 . c) Although loading condition does not have much impact on short-circuit studies, more current from PV fault current injection is available when the load is minimum. Therefore, minimum loading condition is considered for conservative study.
B. REDUCTION OF RELAY REACH
The utility distribution feeder model is simulated initially with a bolted three-phase fault at bus 3 without the large-scale PV and ESS in the system. The fault resistance is increased and the phase-A current through the relay at the substation is monitored. Next, a large-scale PV system is connected to bus 2 and the study is repeated. The fault current profiles seen by the phase overcurrent relay for varied fault resistance as the PV size is increased from 1 MW to 8 MW are shown in Fig. 12 . It is observed that when the PV is not connected, the relay at the substation is insensitive to the three-phase faults with R f > 3.8 . In other words, the phase overcurrent relay cannot detect the three-phase remote end faults having fault resistance higher than 3.8 . The relay is blind to the fact that a fault is present in the system. As the PV size is increased, the corresponding PV fault current contribution I f PV is increased resulting in relay insensitivity at lower fault resistances. For the large-scale PV size of 8 MW, the phase overcurrent relay is insensitive to the remote end three-phase fault with resistance above 2.5 . This means, if the relay at the substation is set to detect a 3.8 fault resistance considering no PV in the system, the relay fails to perform its intended operation due to the presence of PV. The simulation results can be compared with theoretical relay currents predicted using (2) to validate the analysis. The pre-fault voltage of bus 3 is obtained from the load flow program as V sg = 7279 − 33.7 • V. Using the system parameters given in Table 1 Fig. 13 shows the predicted fault currents seen by phase overcurrent relay at the substation using (19) for various PV ratings and R f . The theoretical predictions shown in Fig. 13 closely match with the results obtained using circuit simulations shown in the Fig. 12 , confirming the validity of the analysis. In particular, the PV size to cause relay insensitivity for a remote end three-phase fault resistance of R f = 2.5 is 8 MW in both the figures.
FIGURE 13. Predicted current seen by relay for various PV ratings and R f using (19) . The impact of ESS on the fault current seen by the upstream phase overcurrent relay is studied by connecting a three-phase ESS of rating 3 MW to bus 2 along with the large-scale PV of rating 1 MW. The variation of fault currents seen by the phase overcurrent relay when there is no PV, when the PV is connected to bus 2, and when both PV and ESS are connected to bus 2 is shown in Fig. 14 . It is observed that when the large-scale PV is not connected, the phase overcurrent relay is insensitive to the three-phase faults with R f > 3.8 as in the previous case. When the 1 MW PV is connected, the relay is insensitive to the three-phase faults with R f > 3.6 due to the fault current injection of I f PV = 63 A by the PV. And when the 3 MW ESS is also connected, the relay insensitivity occurs at further lower value of R f > 3.1 due to the additional fault current contribution of I f ESS = 179.6 A by the ESS. The results show that the effect of ESS is similar to that of the large-scale PV for protection studies. As such, the ESS of higher ratings can reduce the overcurrent seen by the upstream phase overcurrent relays and can interfere with the feeder overcurrent protection.
The impact of ground fault current contribution from the large-scale PV on the fault current seen by the ground overcurrent relay can be predicted using (9) for the system parameters in Table 1 . The predicted ground overcurrent results when the large-scale PV ratings are 1 MW and 8 MW are shown in Fig. 15 . For ease of comparison, the ground overcurrent results obtained from the SLG fault simulation using the detailed distribution system model are also shown on the same figure. From both theoretical predictions and simulation results, it is observed that the reduction in the ground fault current seen by the upstream relay increases as the large-scale PV size increases. Note that (9) gives most conservative predictions by considering maximum unbalance in the PV fault current injection. It is observed that the error between the predicted and simulated fault current results in the region of interest where the relay insenstivity of ground overcurrent relay occurs that is at R f = 7 is very less which validates the analysis. When the ESS is also connected, its fault current contribution causes more reduction in the fault currents seen by the phase and ground overcurrent relays. Fig. 16 shows the fault current seen by phase overcurrent relay at the substation when there is no PV, when 1 MW PV connected to bus 2 (three single-phase PV rated 333 kW, unity power factor each), and when both 1 MW PV and 3 MW ESS (three single-phase ESS rated 1 MW each). These results are obtained from distribution circuit simulations. The results confirm that both largescale PV and ESS cause reduction in the fault currents seen by phase overcurrent relays located upstream for the SLG fault downstream of the PV and ESS. Reduction in the ground fault current is observed in case of SLG fault. However, the reduction in the ground fault current due to the presence of PV and ESS is less as compared to the reduction in the phase overcurrent due to the reasons discussed in Section II. The analysis provided in Section IV considers a single large-scale PV connected at middle of the feeder. The largescale PV systems behave like current sources, particularly during fault conditions. They inject fault currents of magnitude determined by their inverters into the system. As such, the locations of the large-scale PV systems generally do not have much influence on the relay insensitivity. Therefore, a set of few large-scale PV systems can be approximated as a single large-scale PV system of size totaling their individual ratings located anywhere on the primary feeder. As mentioned earlier, for conservative protection study, the single equivalent large-scale PV can be placed close to the substation and fault can be considered at the end of the feeder.
To demonstrate the influence of PV locations, four locations along the feeder are chosen for PV deployment. The locations are at substation, mid-feeder and at two feeder ends. The PV systems are of three-phase and rated 500 kW each. The number of PV systems installed in the system is increased from 1 to 24, that is total size of large-scale PV systems is varied from 500 kW to 12000 kW. Twenty scenarios are considered for each 500 kW step increment of PV size, with the locations of the PVs varied stochastically among the four chosen PV locations [18] in each scenario. A three-phase fault with resistance R f = 2.5 is simulated at the end of the feeder at bus 3 and the fault current at the substation is recorded for each scenario. The results are shown in Fig. 17 as a scatter plot wherein each point correspond to one scenario. It is observed that for a three-phase fault with resistance R f = 2.5 , the feeder can host about 8 MW of large-scale PV with relay insensitivity as impact criteria. As can be seen in the figure, the impact of different locations for a given step size is less. Therefore, the analysis for the conservative PV location (that is close to substation) would provide an approximate estimate of the feeder accommodation limit. Fig. 18 shows the single-line diagram of the utility distribution feeder including an adjacent feeder. In OpenDSS, the adjacent feeder is modeled as an aggregated load equal to the yearly demand of the main feeder which is 4726 kW. For sympathetic tripping simulation study, initially a large-scale PV system is connected to the bus 1 and a bolted three-phase fault is simulated at a bus on an adjacent feeder. Both the buses are closest to the substation on the respective feeders. Fig. 19 shows the fault current through the phase overcurrent relay as the large-scale PV size is increased from 0 MW to 20 MW. The figure also shows the effect of ESS on the relay fault current. It is observed that, when the ESS is not connected, the fault current through the phase overcurrent relay is increased as the PV size is increased and reached the pickup value of 1500 A at 16. When the ESS is also connected, it would also inject fault current more than its rated current during the fault conditions. The effect of the fault current contribution from the ESS is studied by connecting an ESS of size 3 MW to bus 1 along with the large-scale PV. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 19 . When the ESS is also connected to the system along with PV, it is observed that the sympathetic tripping occurs at 14.4 MW of large-scale PV rating which is less compared to the case without ESS. This is due to the additional fault current contribution from the ESS. We can make a conservative estimate of the combined PV and ESS rating for the possibility of sympathetic tripping using (15) also which is 16.2 MW. Note that the conservative estimate of the PV and ESS rating for the likelihood of sympathetic tripping is slightly lower than the simulated result. This is due to the fact that the fault current injections from the PV and the ESS in the simulation are out of phase.
C. SYMPATHETIC TRIPPING WITH PV AND ESS
The sympathetic tripping study of the utility feeder for unsymmetrical faults is done by simulating an SLG fault on the adjacent feeder as shown in Fig.18 . The ground fault current seen by the ground overcurrent relay is shown in Fig. 20 as the large-scale PV size is increased from 0 to 20 MW. It is observed that as the PV size is increasing, its ground fault current contribution is also increasing, going above the ground overcurrent pickup value of 750 A at a PV size of 16.2 MW. At this point, the feeder currents in all the three phases are I It can be observed that the sympathetic tripping now occurs at a large-scale PV size of 14.8 MW which is lower than the previous case due to the additional fault current contribution from the ESS. When the ground fault current through the feeder goes above the pickup value, the ground fault current contributions from the PV and the ESS are I result because the ground fault current injections by the PV and ESS are out of phase. However, the deviation of estimated PV and ESS size from the simulated size in this case is less than 7%.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, comprehensive analysis of relay insensitivity and sympathetic tripping problems in a distribution system is provided with an aim to conservatively estimate the largescale PV and ESS accommodation limits of a utility distribution feeder. Based on the analysis, the factors influencing the impact of large-scale PV and ESS on the overcurrent protection schemes are discussed. The proposed analysisbased approach is scalable and thus can be applied to large distribution circuits also. The analytical results are validated by simulation studies using a detailed distribution circuit model of a utility in OpenDSS.
Normally, in addition to the breaker at the substation, the distribution circuits can have few reclosers placed along the feeder. In such cases, the expected fault current can be computed at each recloser using the proposed method. Once we have the expected fault currents with large-scale PV and ESS, the possibility of relay/recloser insensitivity can be checked quickly by comparing with the pickup current setting. Based on the expected fault currents and pickup current settings of the breaker and the reclosers, the possibility of miscoordination problems can also be studied. Note that protection device miscoordination is not in the scope of this study.
In case of sympathetic tripping, the reclosers play a limited role as faults beyond the reclosers do not create sympathetic tripping. When the faults are beyond the reclosers, usually the reclosers perform reclosing operations when the fault is detected in their protected zone creating momentary outages or nuisance tripping. Relay in the faulted feeder clears the fault before these reclosing operations finish and sympathetic tripping happen. Sympathetic tripping is a severe problem compared to nuisance tripping or momentary outages as it results in permanent outage of a complete feeder. 
